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1 Introduction
In most respects inflation targetting since 1989 or thereabouts has been a great
success. It has achieved both low, stable inflation and steady output growth
in most of the countries that practice it. In the United States this fortunate
combination of events has been dubbed “The Great Moderation”. The one
dark cloud on the horizon has been volatility in the prices of financial and
real assets, including stock prices, exchange rates, and housing prices. There
is the suspicion that some of these price movements have not been driven by
fundamentals. That is, they have been bubbles. They may be contributing
to real economic fluctuations. The US stock market rose in the late 1990s in
the dot com boom, and may have been sustained by the “Greeenspan put”.
Subsequently it fell sharply. Housing markets in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, and other countries have risen markedly in the last
few years. In mid to late 2007 the US housing market started to weaken as
the sub-prime mortgage market began to collapse, and markets’ fears about
the riskiness of opaque securitized mortgage-backed assets caused short-term
inter-bank money markets to dry up globally. While the Federal Reserve and
the European Central Bank pumped in liquidity, the Bank of England was
more restrained, and a distressed British lender, Northern Rock, suffered a
bank run, the first in the United Kingdom since 1860. There are fears that a
substantial fall in house prices in the US may cause recession and slow down
global growth.
Among asset prices, the exchange rate has featured prominently in debates
about monetary policy, particularly in economies that target inflation. The
exchange rate has a number of direct and indirect effects on inflation and
real activity, and it introduces additional channels through which monetary
policy can affect the economy, making it a potential policy target. At the same
time it is well documented that exchange rates sometimes experience sustained
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deviations from their long run equilibrium, followed by sudden corrections. The
impact of these “unwarranted” exchange rate movements on macroeconomic
performance has been a concern of central bankers and scholars.
As the dollar weakened in 2007 and the Euro rose to $1.40 and beyond, there
were calls from European politicians for the European Central Bank to trim its
interest rate policy so as to manage the Euro. The United States continues to
call on China to allow further upward adjustment of the Renminbi, in order to
foster an orderly adjustment of the so-called “global imbalances”. There have
been concerns in the United Kingdom that the pound has become overvalued
relative to the dollar and the Euro. Iceland is an example of a very small
country whose relatively high interest rates, needed to curb inflation, have
attracted large speculative “carry trade” inflows, and whose exchange rate has
become greatly overvalued as a result. There has been an ongoing debate over
the last ten years as to how should central banks respond to these asset price
movements. One widely held view is that an inflation-targetting central bank
should not take asset prices into account when setting interest rates except
insofar as they help to predict future inflation. This conclusion is reached by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999). The opposing view is that central banks should
adjust interest rates partly with a view to dampening bubbles in asset prices,
on the basis that bubbles should not be allowed to grow large, because a large
correction in the future could harm the economy more than a small one now.
Representatives of this point of view include Cecchetti et al. (2000), who argue
that central banks can improve macroeconomic performance by responding to
asset prices as well as to expected inflation and to the output gap. In a similar
vein, Ball (1999) shows that an interest rate policy rule that responds only to
output and inflation, like a Taylor rule, is not optimal for an open economy.
Svensson (2000), using a forward-looking model, concludes that the exchange
rate can be a very useful instrument in stabilising Consumer Price Index (CPI)
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inflation.
One of the obstacles to using the interest rate to dampen bubbles is that
it is empirically very difficult to determine whether or not there is a bubble.
Cecchetti et al. (2000) confront this problem and conclude that nevertheless
it is worthwhile attempting to respond to movements that are believed to be
bubbles. Wollmersha¨user (2006) and Zampolli (2006) conclude that reacting to
the exchange rate improves macroeconomic stability in models that incorporate
exchange rate uncertainty. Wollmersha¨user (2006) finds that monetary policy
rules that include an exchange rate term are more robust to a high degree of
uncertainty concerning the relationship between the nominal exchange rate and
the nominal interest rate or other macroeconomic variables. Zampolli (2006)
uses a simple backward-looking model of the type defined in Ball (1999) with
a regime-switching exchange rate, aimed at capturing the complex behavior of
financial markets. Despite these results, this is not a settled question. Batini
and Nelson (2000), who model a bubble in the exchange rate as an exogenous
process that temporarily shifts it away from its long-run equilibrium, find that
responding to the exchange rate does not improve welfare in most cases, and
may even lower it. Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m (2005) analyze the impact of
exchange rate uncertainty on the conduct of monetary policy and conclude that
policy rules without an exchange rate term, namely a Taylor rule, are optimal
for the stabilization of a small open economy. Gilchrist and Saito (2006) show
that responding to perceived bubbles can improve performance, but it very
much depends on the circumstances. When asset prices are driven also by
changes in the rate of productivity growth which are not correctly measured
by the policy makers, interventions become less useful and may actually be
harmful.
While the theoretical literature has asked whether central banks should
direct policy towards asset prices, the empirical question is whether or not they
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actually appear to do it. Here again, the evidence is mixed. Some results, such
as those of Clarida and Gertler (1997), suggest that central banks indirectly try
to influence the exchange rate through movements in the interest rate. Lubik
and Schorfheide (2007), who analyze different specifications of the monetary
policy reaction function for four small open economies (Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and United Kingdom) over the last two decades, conclude that
the central banks of Canada and England include the nominal exchange rate
in the policy rule, while those of Australia and New Zealand do not. Thus the
normative question appears to have some relevance to actual policy.
In view of the continuing debate over the merits of using interest rates to
dampen asset price bubbles, the present paper extends the analysis of Zampolli
(2006). We follow that paper in allowing for regime-switching in exchange rate
movements. This is intended to capture the idea that exchange rates have
quiescent periods, when they appear to be driven largely by fundamentals,
interspersed with periods when bubbles seem to develop. But the absence of
forward-looking behavior in Zampolli (2006) prevents his model from capturing
the essential role of expectations in monetary policy and asset markets. Therefore
we consider a forward-looking open-economy model of the type used in Svensson
(2000) and in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005).
We assume that the exchange rate may be in one of two states. In one
regime it randomly oscillates around its equilibrium, defined by the real interest
parity condition. In the other regime the deviations from equilibrium are
persistent. We experiment a range of values for the transition probabilities
and for the persistence coefficient. We assume that the transition probabilities
are exogenous and known to policymakers. We therefore abstract from the
issue of imperfect information concerning the process that drives the exchange
rate.1 Uncertainty in this context results from the policymaker not knowing in
1Alexandre and Bac¸a˜o (2005) deal with this issue in the context of equity price
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which regime the exchange rate will be in the next period. In other words, the
policymaker observes the current state of the exchange rate process and knows
the probability of the economy moving to a different state.
We start our analysis by comparing the optimal welfare loss when the
policymaker faces no uncertainty about the nature of the shock to the real
exchange rate and when policymakers are uncertain about the future state of
the economy. Then we analyze the performance of simple policy rules, both
with and without an exchange rate term, and evaluate their robustness in
dealing with exchange rate uncertainty.
Finally, we evaluate the benefits from taking into account the switching
nature of the economy by comparing the performance of time-invariant rules
to regime-switching rules.
Section 2 describes our open-economy model and the monetary policy framework.
Section 3 evaluates the welfare loss for a set of policy rules under exchange
rate uncertainty. Section 4 checks the sensitivity and robustness of the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 An open economy with a regime-switching
exchange rate
The exchange rate introduces additional channels for monetary policy through
its effects on aggregate demand and inflation. In Ball (1999), the change in the
exchange rate affects inflation because it is passed directly into import prices.
Following Svensson (2000) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), the inclusion of
the exchange rate in our model adds three channels for monetary policy to
affect the Consumer Price Index (CPI). First, it can affect inflation with a lag
misalignments.
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through its effect on aggregate demand. Second, the exchange rate can affect
domestic inflation, and therefore the CPI, by affecting domestic currency prices
of imported intermediate goods and, more indirectly, through its effects on
nominal wages that depend on the evolution of the CPI. Finally, the exchange
rate affects CPI inflation through its effects on domestic currency prices of
imported final goods. Therefore, the model that we describe below tries to
capture all these three effects. In our computations we start by calibrating the
model using Svensson (2000) values for these parameters. Later we analyze the
behavior of the economy using parameter values that correspond to a higher
degree of openness. The lag structure of our model is such that it captures the
often mentioned fact (see, e.g., Svensson (2000); Ball (1999)) that monetary
policy can affect the consumer price index with a shorter lag through the
exchange rate channels.
2.1 The model
Our stylized system of macroeconomic equations is the following:
yt = Etyt+1 − α1 (it − Etpit+1) + α2y∗t−1 + α3qt + εdt , (1)
pidt = β1pi
d
t−1 + (1− β1) βEtpidt+1 + β2yt−1 + β3(qt − qt−1) + εst , (2)
qt = Etqt+1 − it + Etpit+1 + i∗t − Etpi∗t+1 + εqt , (3)
pit = pi
d
t + ω(qt − qt−1), (4)
εst = ρ
sεst−1 + e
s
t , (5)
εdt = ρ
dεdt−1 + e
d
t , (6)
εqt = ρ
q
stε
q
t−1 + e
q
t , (7)
y∗t = ρy∗y
∗
t−1 + e
y∗
t , (8)
pi∗t = ρpi∗pi
∗
t−1 + e
pi∗
t , (9)
i∗t = ρi∗pi
∗
t + ρ
′
i∗y
∗
t + e
i∗
t . (10)
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Eq. (1) is the aggregate demand equation for an open economy of the type
used in Svensson (2000). Output depends on its own expected value, on the
real interest rate, on the lagged foreign output, y∗t , and on the real exchange
rate, q. In this model the real exchange rate affects the aggregate demand
because it affects the the relative price between domestic and foreign goods:
a higher q means depreciation, that is, qt ≡ st + p∗t − pt, where s is the price
of foreign currency in terms of domestic money, p∗t and pt are the foreign and
domestic price levels, respectively. Additionally, output depends on a demand
shock that we assume to follow an AR(1) process, as in Eq. (6). Following
Svensson (2000) we set the following values for the coefficients in the aggregate
demand equation: α1 = 0.6, α2 = 0.05 and α3 = 0.04.
Eq. (2) is a “hybrid” Phillips curve where pidt is domestic inflation. In face
of the discussion and evidence provided in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), we have
substituted lagged output for the marginal cost, and we also include some
open-economy elements. Following the survey of empirical estimates presented
in Rudebusch (2002), we consider the inflation persistence coefficient to be
β1 = 0.4. We set β = 0.99 as in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), and β2 = 0.13 as
in Rudebusch (2002). The inclusion of the change in the exchange rate in the
domestic inflation equation aims at capturing its effect on domestic currency
prices of imported intermediate goods. In our analysis, we follow Svensson
(2000) and we set the pass-through parameter, that gives the impact of changes
in the exchange rates on domestic inflation, β3 = 0.01.
In equilibrium the uncovered interest parity condition holds, that is, it −
i∗t = Etst+1 − st. However, we assume that the exchange rate may deviate
from its fundamental value due to an exchange-rate risk premium, εqt . Using
this assumption, Eq. (3) defines the real interest parity condition. Leitemo
and So¨derstro¨m (2005) and Wollmersha¨user (2006) study the implications for
monetary policy of uncertainty on the exchange rate model. In this paper we
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assume there is no uncertainty concerning the exchange rate model. Uncertainty
concerning the behavior of the exchange rate comes from a Markov-switching
autoregressive coefficient in the exchange-rate risk premium shock.
Eq. (7) specifies the process for the shock in the exchange rate. We assume
that the exchange rate may be in one of two states. In state 1, ρqst > 0
and therefore the exchange rate deviates persistently from its fundamental
value. This state represents times of instability, where the exchange rate is
“disconnected” from fundamentals for long periods.2 In state 2, ρqst = 0 and
thus the exchange rate is subject to random shocks that disturb it from its
fundamental value, but without any persistence. The variance of the exogenous
shock eqt is the same across regimes, which implies that, as seems reasonable,
the variance of εqt increases in the first regime, and the higher the persistence
the more it increases.
The state of the economy is assumed to evolve as a Markov chain with the
following probability transition matrix:
P =
 p11 p12
p21 p22
 . (11)
where pij = 1−pii (when i 6= j) and pij is the probability of moving from state
i in the current period to state j in the next period. In our computations we
use the values 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 for pii. In the single state model, we have
ρq1 = ρ
q
2 and thus the probability transition matrix becomes irrelevant. We also
use a range of values for the autoregressive coefficient in the first regime: 0.5
(mild persistence), 0.9 (high persistence) and 1.1 (explosive).
Bordo and Jeanne (2002), in a three period model, assumed that monetary
policy can affect the transition probabilities. Zampolli (2006) argues that
2Several authors have provided rationales for the “disconnect puzzle” described in
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001). For example, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) assume
heterogeneous agents with different beliefs about the behavior of the exchange rate, which
results in persistent deviations from equilibrium and non-linear behavior.
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assuming exogenous transition probabilities is not unreasonable given the high
degree of uncertainty about the stochastic properties of an asset price and
their relationship with monetary policy. We follow this author and in our
computations we assume that the transition probabilities are exogenous and
observed by policymakers. We therefore abstract from the issue of imperfect
information at this stage. In this context, the policymaker is uncertain only
about the exchange rate regime in the next period.
In our analysis, only the parameters in the policy rules and the autoregressive
coefficient of the risk premium may vary with the state. Other parameters do
not adjust to changes in the state of the economy or to changes in policy
rules. To the extent that the other parameters in the model do not only
reflect preferences and technology, deep structural parameters, guaranteed to
be invariant to policy rules, but also reflect behavioral rules, as in wage and
price-setting, for example, our analysis may be subject to the Lucas critique.
However, while this may be an issue in principle, we do not believe it is serious
in practice.
Clarida et al. (2001) show that in an open economy it is important to
distinguish between domestic inflation and consumer price inflation, as measured
by the Consumer Price Index. These authors conclude that for an economy
with perfect exchange-rate pass-through the central bank should target domestic
inflation and let the exchange rate float. To take this into account we work
with both measures of inflation. Eq. (4) defines CPI inflation, pi, as a function
of domestic inflation and the change in the real exchange rate (which captures
the effects of a rise in the domestic-currency prices of imported foreign goods,
pift ),
3 where ω is the share of imported goods in CPI. Through this effect the
exchange rate can affect the CPI directly, and it allows monetary policy to
3As described in Svensson (2000), pift is given by pi
f
t = p
f
t − pft−1 = pi∗t + st − st−1 =
pit + qt − qt−1, where pft = p∗t + st is the domestic-currency price of imported foreign goods
and pi∗t is foreign inflation.
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affect CPI inflation with a shorter lag than through the aggregate demand
channel. The effect of the exchange rate on the CPI depends on the weight
of the domestic-currency inflation of imported foreign goods. Svensson (2000)
sets ω = 0.3. We use this openness degree as our benchmark, but later we
consider alternative values.
As in Svensson (2000) we assume that foreign output and foreign inflation
follow stationary AR(1) processes as described in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), and
we set ρy∗ = ρpi∗ = 0.8, while the foreign interest rate is assumed to follow a
Taylor rule — 10 — with ρi∗ = 1.5, ρ
′
i∗ = 0.5.
2.2 Policy rules and welfare
A Markov-switching rational expectations model requires adequate solution
methods. Svensson and Williams (2005, henceforth SW) and Farmer et al.
(2006, henceforth FWZ) propose two such methods. SW’s method uses an
iterative procedure similar to the one used to solve simple optimal linear
quadratic regulator problems. FWZ rightly argue that SW’s method does not
tell us whether the solution is unique. FWZ propose a modification of Sims
(2001) method to deal with the case of Markov-switching rational expectations
while maintaining the ability to analyze the uniqueness of the solution. In
this paper we employ SW’s method to compute the optimal loss, and base our
numerical optimization of simple rules on FWZ’s method, selecting only rules
that correspond to unique and stable solutions. The application of the SW and
FWZ methods to our model is described in the Appendix.
Simple rules have been widely discussed among academics in monetary
policy analysis. Several arguments have been used in its defense. On one hand,
it has been argued that simple rules perform nearly as well as optimal rules
(see, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)). On the other hand, it has
been argued that simple rules are very robust to several types of uncertainty
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(see, for example, Levin et al. (1999). We therefore use simple rules to see how
they compare to the optimal policy rule and how robust they are in dealing
with exchange rate uncertainty. The different rules are summarized in Table
1.
We compute the optimal parameters for Taylor-type (denoted TR in Table
1) and inflation-forecast based (IFB) policy rules. In the Taylor-type policy
rule the interest rate reacts to deviations of output and inflation from the target
(assumed to be zero). Additionally, we look at the Taylor-type policy rule with
an exchange rate term (denoted TR+q). As a benchmark, we also look at the
performance of the Taylor rule as defined in Taylor (1993), denoted TRo. In
our computations we assume that the policymaker reacts to CPI inflation. In
section 4 we report results using domestic inflation instead of CPI inflation in
our set of policy rules.
In the inflation-forecast based policy rule the interest rate responds to
deviations of expected inflation from the target. We also consider an inflation-forecast
based rule with an exchange rate term (IFB+q) — see Levin et al. (2003) for
a discussion of the rationale and robustness of inflation-forecast based rules.
As in Zampolli (2006), we compute both time-invariant policy rules (denoted
by an I) and regime-switching policy rules. The inclusion of time-invariant
policy rules, where the switching nature of the exchange rate misalignments is
not taken into consideration, is based on the argument that they could be a
good option if the policymaker cannot observe the regime — see Zampolli
(2006). Also, many of the rules are optimized over a restricted range of
parameter values (and these are denoted by an R).
Several papers — see, for example, Kirsanova et al. (2006), and references
therein — have discussed whether monetary policy should target domestic
inflation or consumer price inflation. We start by considering a loss function
that includes CPI inflation, the output gap and the change in the interest rate.
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Later we assume a loss function that includes domestic inflation instead of CPI
inflation. Therefore, the values of the parameters in policy rules are chosen so
as to minimize the following loss function (also used by, e.g., Rudebusch and
Svensson, 1999):
Loss Function = V (pit) + V (yt) + 0.5V (it − it−1) , (12)
where V (x) represents the unconditional variance of variable x, i.e., the policy
rule aims at minimizing a weighted sum of the unconditional variances of
output, CPI inflation and the change in the interest rate.
3 Monetary policy under exchange rate uncertainty
As mentioned in the introductory section, evidence from simulated open-economy
models with exchange rate uncertainty on whether monetary policy should
react to the exchange rate is mixed. Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m (2005) analyze
the impact of exchange rate uncertainty for the conduct of monetary policy and
conclude that policy rules without an exchange rate term, namely a Taylor rule,
are optimal at stabilizing a small open economy. However, Wollmersha¨user
(2006) and Zampolli (2006), in models that allow for uncertainty in the exchange
rate, show that a reaction to the exchange rate is welfare enhancing. Wollmersha¨user
(2006) uses a model with uncertainty on the exchange rate model and concludes
that monetary policy rules that include an exchange rate term are more robust.
Zampolli (2006) introduces a regime-switching exchange rate in a simple
backward looking model. In his analysis policymakers are uncertain about the
nature of the shock that hits the real exchange rate. Policymakers therefore
have to assign probabilities to a transitory shock and to a very persistent or
bubble shock. Zampolli (2006) then investigates how that type of uncertainty
affects the optimal reaction of policy instruments and how that reaction depends
on the transition probabilities that characterize the shock. He concludes that
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an invariant Taylor rule performs significantly worse than the optimal policy
when the probability of continuing in the bubble regime is high and the probability
of continuing in the other regime is low. Zampolli also concludes that a time
invariant Taylor rule that includes an exchange rate term performs noticeably
better than a time invariant Taylor rule without an exchange rate term. A
drawback of Zampolli’s analysis is the absence of forward-looking behavior
which prevents the model from capturing the essential role of expectations in
monetary policy and in asset markets. Therefore, we extend Zampolli’s analysis
by considering an open-economy forward-looking model of the type described
above.
Following Zampolli’s strategy, we started by computing, as a benchmark,
the value of the optimal loss when policymakers face no uncertainty about the
nature of the shock on the real exchange rate, that is, they know it to be white
noise. Results for this case and for optimized policy rules are presented in
Table 2. In the case of optimized policy rules we restricted our attention to
determinate solutions, as in Levin et al. (2003).
We then simulated the model and computed the optimal policy for different
values of the transition probabilities and for different values of the autoregressive
coefficient on the real exchange rate shock. We assumed the shock on the
real exchange rate to be mildly persistent, very persistent or to be of the
bubble type. The values for the transition probabilities and the autoregressive
coefficients and the corresponding value of the central bank’s loss are presented
in Tables 3 to 6.4
The results in Table 3 show that introducing uncertainty in the behavior
of the non-fundamental shock that affects the real exchange rate increases,
as expected, the welfare loss. The welfare loss increase is higher when the
4Tables 7 to 18 report the results for the variance of the output gap, inflation, exchange
rate and interest rate for all policy rules and for the different degrees of persistence.
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persistence of the non-fundamental shock is higher. It also increases with the
probability of being in the regime where the non-fundamental shock to the real
exchange rate is persistent, i.e., the loss increases with p11 and decreases with
p22. The effect on welfare is nonlinear: the effect is magnified as persistence
increases towards (and beyond) unity. In fact, the values in Table 3 that stand
out are those associated with high persistence (ρq1 = 1.1) and high duration
of the “bubble” period (p11 = 0.75); the loss increases between 22% and 34%
compared to the case with white noise deviations and without regime-switching
in the exchange rate.
The Taylor and inflation–forecast based rules, described above and summarized
in Table 1, perform much worse than the optimal policy. From the results
presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 we can see that the difference exceeds 30% of
the optimal loss. We can also conclude that the optimized Taylor rule is always
better than the corresponding inflation-forecast based rule, by a margin of at
least 20%. The original Taylor rule is worse than an optimized Taylor rule
by at least 7%. But it is usually better than an inflation-forecast based rule,
except in our worst possible scenario: ρq1 = 1.1, p11 = 0.75, p22 = 0.25.
Optimized Taylor rules have coefficients that vary widely with the parameters
of the model and tend to be extremely large, sometimes even exceeding 2000.
However, restricting the coefficients not to exceed 5, so as not to be too far from
the original coefficients and from the coefficients employed in other studies, does
not affect the loss very much: the difference is below 0.7% (see Tables 4 and
5). The optimized parameters of IFB rules are always between 1.5 and 2.5 for
Etpit+1, and between 0 and 0.3 for qt.
Reacting to the exchange rate does not yield large dividends in the case
of the Taylor rule: the difference is less than 0.8%. The optimized Taylor
rule without an exchange rate term seems to be robust in the context of
regime-switching in the exchange rate. These results, presented in Table 4,
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appear to reinforce the findings of Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m (2005). Taylor
(2001) argues that the indirect response to the exchange rate through the
output gap and inflation terms in the policy rule severely reduces the benefits
from reacting directly to the exchange rate. This indirect effect may be at
work in our model.
However, in the case of an inflation-based forecast rule (results in Table 6),
the benefit from reacting to the exchange rate is never below 7% and may even
go beyond 20%. Again, significant benefits from reacting to the exchange rate
arise when the shock and the bubble-regime are very persistent: ρq1 = 1.1, p11 =
0.75. Welfare gains from the reaction to the exchange rate result from a more
stable output, inflation and policy instrument. Batini et al. (2003) find similar
results for the time-invariant case.
In order to evaluate the benefits from switching the policy rule coefficients
according to the exchange rate regime we compare the performance of time
invariant rules to regime-switching rules. The results for the case of the
inflation-based forecast rule, presented in Table 6, show that an optimized time
invariant rule leads to an increase in welfare loss of less than 0.2%, i.e., taking
into account the switching nature of the economy does not bring significant
benefits, both when the policy rule includes an exchange rate term and when
it does not.
In the case of the Taylor rule, comparing the results in Tables 4 and 5, we
conclude that the use of an optimized time invariant rule leads to an increase
in welfare loss below 0.5%, in general. However, the difference goes up to 6% in
our worst scenario (ρq1 = 1.1, p11 = 0.75, p22 = 0.25). It appears that taking into
account the switching nature of the economy is important only in extreme cases.
The same applies to the case where a restricted, optimized, time-invariant
Taylor rule is used, though the difference in welfare loss is slightly bigger. These
results seem to corroborate the findings of Zampolli (2006) in the context of a
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backward-looking model.
In order to check the sensitivity and the robustness of the results, in the
next section we present our computations with a higher degree of openness and
with a loss function and policy rules that include domestic inflation instead of
the CPI inflation.
4 Sensitivity and robustness analysis
The exchange rate parameters in the IS, Phillips curve and CPI equations are
crucial for the working of the transmission mechanism through the exchange
rate channel. These parameters determine the exposure of the economy to
exchange rate shocks. Therefore, we start our sensitivity analysis by checking
the robustness of the baseline results to an increase in the degree of openness.
For that purpose we use parameter values similar to those estimated for Scandinavian
economies. In these countries, the import/GDP ratio is around 0.4, which is
the new value for the coefficient ω in CPI equation, Eq. (4). The new coefficient
for the real exchange rate in the aggregate demand equation, α3, is 0.1. The
Phillips curve pass-through parameter, β3, is equal to 0.1. These parameters
are based on the estimates of Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Hunt (2006).
The results obtained for the new parameters are very similar to the results
obtained for the baseline parameters. The only fact to notice from the new
computations is the difficulty of finding a unique stable solution for the IFB
rule when it does not include an exchange rate term.
In our computations we considered a loss function that is a weighted sum
of the unconditional variances of output, interest rate and CPI inflation. The
inclusion of CPI inflation in the policymaker’s objective function combines
both the domestic inflation and the exchange rate, see Eq. (4). Benigno
and Benigno (2003), De Paoli (2006) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) show
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that social welfare functions for open economies include the terms of trade
gap. However, Kirsanova et al. (2006) note that including an exchange rate
term explicitly, or implicitly through the CPI inflation, in the welfare function
remains unorthodox.5 Additionally, Clarida et al. (2001), Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2005), among other authors, show that there may be an isomorphism between
welfare functions in closed and open economies. These authors derived social
welfare functions for open economies directly from the consumer’s utility function
and concluded that the policymaker’s objective function for an open economy
can be written as a quadratic function in output and domestic inflation. In
order to check the robustness of our results to the form of the policymakers’s
loss function we conduct our computations considering a loss function that
is a weighted sum of the unconditional variances of output, interest rate and
domestic inflation. The policy rule parameters are then chosen such that they
minimize the following loss function:
Loss Function = V
(
pidt
)
+ V (yt) + 0.5V (it − it−1) . (13)
From the computations for the new loss function we conclude that our
baseline results are robust, as they do not seem to depend on whether domestic
or CPI inflation is included in the policymaker’s objective function.
Svensson (2000) considers two versions of the Taylor rule, one in which the
policy instrument responds to CPI inflation and another in which it reacts to
domestic inflation. Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) define a policy rule in which the
interest rule responds to deviations of domestic inflation and/or the output gap
from the target, on the basis that a rule of that type can avoid indeterminacy
problems. Following these authors, substitute domestic inflation for CPI inflation
in the policy rules described in Table 1, both for the new calibration and for the
5Although Kirsanova et al. (2006) give an example where the inclusion of terms of trade
or real exchange rate gap may be justified. These authors also emphasize that the derivations
of social welfare functions from consumers’ utility depend on the structure of the model.
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new loss function. In general, we conclude that reacting to domestic inflation
is worse than reacting to CPI inflation. Adolfson (2007), in a model with
imperfect exchange rate pass-through, also concludes that reacting to CPI
inflation is better than reacting to domestic inflation. As argued in Taylor
(2001) this result may be explained by the indirect reaction to the exchange
rate when the interest rate reacts to CPI inflation.
To conclude, the baseline results remain fairly robust when we consider
a higher degree of openness and when we consider domestic inflation in the
policymaker’s objective function and in the Taylor and IFB policy rules. The
only result to be stressed is the difficulty of finding a unique stable solution
for the IFB rule, in the very open economy case, when it does not include an
exchange rate term. Levin et al. (2003) show that the inclusion of an output
gap term and a lagged interest rate term makes the inflation-forecast based
rule more robust and reduces the region of indeterminacy.
5 Conclusion
Evidence from simulated open-economy models with exchange rate uncertainty
on whether monetary policy should react to the exchange rate is mixed. We
study this issue in a Markov-switching model. In our model the exchange rate
may be in one of two states: in one regime it randomly oscillates around its
equilibrium; in the other regime the deviations from equilibrium are persistent.
The welfare loss increases with the persistence of the non-fundamental shock
and with the probability of being in the regime where the misalignment in
the exchange rate is persistent. We assume that the transition probabilities
are exogenous and observed by policymakers, and that the current state is
known to policymakers. Despite the difficulties of anticipating the effects of
monetary policy on financial markets, future research should look at models
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with unobserved and endogenous transition probabilities along the lines of
Davig and Leeper (2006).
In our model, simple policy rules perform much worse than the optimal
policy. Optimized Taylor rules are always better than the corresponding inflation-forecast
based rule. The optimized Taylor rule without an exchange rate term seems
to be robust in the context of exchange rate uncertainty. However, significant
welfare gains from adding an exchange rate term to the inflation-based forecast
rule arise when the shock and the bubble-regime are very persistent.
Finally, we evaluate the benefits from taking into account the switching
nature of the economy by comparing the performance of time invariant rules to
regime switching rules. We conclude that taking into account the regime-switching
in the exchange rate, both for the Taylor rule and for the inflation-based
forecast rule, does not bring significant benefits. However, when the shock
and the bubble-regime are very persistent an optimized time invariant Taylor
rule can increase the welfare loss significantly.
Our results for a forward-looking model seem to corroborate the results that
Zampolli (2006) obtained in the context of a backward-looking model. Taking
into account the switching nature of the economy is important only in extreme
cases. Computations for a higher degree of openness and for domestic inflation
in the policymaker’s objective function and in the Taylor and IFB policy rules
show the robustness of the baseline results.
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Appendix
We employed the Svensson-Williams method to find the optimal policy in a
Markov-switching model of the form: Xt+1
HstEtxt+1
 = Ast
 Xt
xt
+Bstit +
 Cst
0
 et+1, (14)
where Hst , Ast , Bst , Cst are Markov-switching matrices, it is the control variable
(in our model, the nominal interest rate) and st is the state.
In our model, we defined:
Xt =
(
εst , ε
d
t , ε
q
t , y
∗
t , pi
∗
t , i
∗
t , y
∗
t−1, i
∗
t−1, yt−1, qt−1, pi
d
t−1
)′
, (15)
xt =
(
yt, pi
d
t , qt, pit
)′
, (16)
et =
(
est , e
d
t , e
q
t , e
y∗
t , e
pi∗
t , e
i∗
t
)′
, (17)
Hst =

1 0 0 α1
0 (1− β1)β 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0

, (18)
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Ast =

ρs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ρd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρqst 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ρy∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ρpi∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ρ′i∗ρy∗ ρi∗ρpi∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 −α2 0 0 0 0 1 0 −α3 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −β2 β3 −β1 0 1 −β3 0
0 0 −1 0 ρpi∗ −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ω 0 0 −1 −ω 1

,
(19)
Bst = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, α1, 0, 1, 0)
′ , (20)
Cst =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 ρ′i∗ ρi∗ 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

. (21)
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The Farmer-Waggoner-Zha method was used to solve, with an arbitrary
policy rule, a Markov-switching model of the form: a1(st)
a2
xt =
 b1(st)
b2
xt−1 +
 Ψ(st)
0
 et +
 0
Π
 ηt, (22)
where et are exogenous i.i.d. variables, ηt is the vector of expectational errors
and the vector xt includes expected values.
In our model, we defined:
xt =
(
εst , ε
d
t , ε
q
t , y
∗
t , pi
∗
t , i
∗
t , it, it−1, yt, pi
d
t , qt, pit, Etyt+1, Etpi
d
t+1, Etqt+1, Etpit+1
)′
,
(23)
et =
(
est , e
d
t , e
q
t , e
y∗
t , e
pi∗
t , e
i∗
t
)′
, (24)
ηt =
(
ηyt , η
pid
t , η
q
t , η
pi
t
)′
, (25)
a1(st) =

0 −1 0 0 0 0 α1 0 1 0 −α3 0 −1 0 0 −α1
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −β3 0 0 −(1− β1)β 0 0
0 0 −1 0 ρpi∗ −1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −ω 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −ρ′i∗ −ρi∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
(26)
a2 =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

, (27)
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b1(st) =

0 −1 0 0 0 0 α1 0 1 0 −α3 0 −1 0 0 −α1
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −β3 0 0 −(1− β1)β 0 0
0 0 −1 0 ρpi∗ −1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −ω 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −ρ′i∗ −ρi∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −δyst −δpidst −δqst −δpist 0 −δe
d
st 0 −δest
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
(28)
b2 =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

, (29)
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Ψ(st) =

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

, (30)
Π =

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0

. (31)
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Tables
Table 1: Simple policy rules
Rule Formula
TRo it = 1.5pit + 0.5yt
TR+q it = δ
pi
stpit + δ
y
styt + δ
q
stqt
TR it = δ
pi
stpit + δ
y
styt
TR+q R it = δ
pi
stpit + δ
y
styt + δ
q
stqt, δ
pi
st , δ
y
st ∈ [0, 5], δqst ∈ [−1, 1]
TR R it = δ
pi
stpit + δ
y
styt, δ
pi
st , δ
y
st ∈ [0, 5]
TR+q RI it = δ
pipit + δ
yyt + δ
qqt, δ
pi, δy ∈ [0, 5], δq ∈ [−1, 1]
TR RI it = δ
pipit + δ
yyt, δ
pi, δy ∈ [0, 5]
TR+q I it = δ
pipit + δ
yyt + δ
qqt
TR I it = δ
pipit + δ
yyt
IFB+q it = δ
e
stEtpit+1 + δ
q
stqt
IFB it = δ
e
stEtpit+1
IFB+q I it = δ
eEtpit+1 + δ
qqt
IFB I it = δ
eEtpit+1
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Table 2: Loss with one regime
ρq1 = ρ
q
2
Policy 0.0 0.5 0.9
Optimal 14.352 14.536 17.123
TR+q 19.117 19.533 24.750
TR 19.142 19.543 24.785
TR+q R 19.233 19.648 24.775
TR R 19.253 19.657 24.877
TRo 20.721 21.098 27.933
IFB+q 28.423 28.509 32.227
IFB 30.534 30.770 37.636
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Table 3: Loss: Optimal policy and the original Taylor rule
Optimal TRo
p22 p22
ρq1 p11 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
0.5 0.25 14.405 14.394 14.379 20.831 20.808 20.776
0.5 0.50 14.426 14.414 14.394 20.873 20.848 20.810
0.5 0.75 14.464 14.451 14.427 20.950 20.930 20.892
0.9 0.25 14.500 14.470 14.426 21.038 20.968 20.876
0.9 0.50 14.633 14.586 14.509 21.301 21.209 21.067
0.9 0.75 15.041 14.965 14.813 22.169 22.080 21.885
1.1 0.25 14.584 14.538 14.468 21.266 21.127 20.966
1.1 0.50 14.963 14.863 14.693 22.103 21.791 21.428
1.1 0.75 19.155 18.627 17.563 31.541 27.840 25.581
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Table 4: Loss: optimized Taylor rule
TR+q TR
p22 p22
ρq1 p11 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
0.5 0.25 19.239 19.214 19.179 19.260 19.236 19.203
0.5 0.50 19.286 19.261 19.220 19.306 19.282 19.242
0.5 0.75 19.373 19.354 19.314 19.390 19.371 19.334
0.9 0.25 19.481 19.405 19.302 19.501 19.428 19.327
0.9 0.50 19.770 19.677 19.525 19.790 19.698 19.547
0.9 0.75 20.621 20.561 20.406 20.632 20.574 20.420
1.1 0.25 19.753 19.599 19.414 19.771 19.623 19.439
1.1 0.50 20.604 20.320 19.936 20.629 20.325 19.958
1.1 0.75 27.304 25.284 23.828 27.309 25.313 23.864
TR+q R TR R
p22 p22
ρq1 p11 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
0.5 0.25 19.357 19.331 19.295 19.375 19.350 19.315
0.5 0.50 19.404 19.377 19.335 19.421 19.395 19.354
0.5 0.75 19.489 19.469 19.427 19.504 19.484 19.444
0.9 0.25 19.592 19.515 19.413 19.612 19.535 19.433
0.9 0.50 19.872 19.779 19.628 19.892 19.798 19.647
0.9 0.75 20.725 20.663 20.488 20.743 20.676 20.502
1.1 0.25 19.850 19.699 19.519 19.874 19.721 19.539
1.1 0.50 20.708 20.401 20.025 20.733 20.421 20.043
1.1 0.75 27.427 25.388 23.892 27.460 25.426 23.959
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Table 5: Loss: invariant optimized Taylor rule
TR+q I TR I
p22 p22
ρq1 p11 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
0.5 0.25 19.241 19.216 19.180 19.260 19.237 19.203
0.5 0.50 19.289 19.264 19.221 19.307 19.283 19.243
0.5 0.75 19.375 19.356 19.315 19.391 19.373 19.334
0.9 0.25 19.490 19.412 19.306 19.505 19.430 19.328
0.9 0.50 19.788 19.691 19.532 19.799 19.705 19.551
0.9 0.75 20.693 20.620 20.427 20.694 20.622 20.431
1.1 0.25 19.770 19.611 19.420 19.784 19.629 19.442
1.1 0.50 20.698 20.362 19.955 20.703 20.370 19.968
1.1 0.75 28.807 25.935 24.001 28.886 25.986 24.034
TR+q RI TR RI
p22 p22
ρq1 p11 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
0.5 0.25 19.359 19.332 19.296 19.375 19.350 19.315
0.5 0.50 19.406 19.379 19.336 19.421 19.396 19.354
0.5 0.75 19.491 19.470 19.428 19.504 19.485 19.444
0.9 0.25 19.600 19.521 19.416 19.614 19.537 19.434
0.9 0.50 19.889 19.791 19.634 19.898 19.803 19.649
0.9 0.75 20.775 20.698 20.506 20.775 20.699 20.509
1.1 0.25 19.867 19.709 19.523 19.879 19.725 19.541
1.1 0.50 20.768 20.437 20.039 20.771 20.443 20.050
1.1 0.75 28.817 25.949 24.029 28.960 26.025 24.074
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Table 6: Loss: inflation forecast based rule
IFB+q IFB
p22 p22
ρq1 p11 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
0.5 0.25 28.422 28.418 28.418 30.586 30.573 30.559
0.5 0.50 28.428 28.425 28.424 30.610 30.597 30.579
0.5 0.75 28.451 28.448 28.446 30.661 30.651 30.632
0.9 0.25 28.519 28.485 28.454 30.799 30.733 30.654
0.9 0.50 28.629 28.584 28.529 31.031 30.937 30.808
0.9 0.75 29.121 29.060 28.940 31.868 31.729 31.495
1.1 0.25 28.652 28.571 28.496 31.083 30.920 30.751
1.1 0.50 29.079 28.894 28.704 31.934 31.536 31.141
1.1 0.75 34.528 32.421 30.971 41.639 37.125 34.543
IFB+q I IFB I
p22 p22
ρq1 p11 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
0.5 0.25 28.422 28.418 28.418 30.586 30.573 30.559
0.5 0.50 28.428 28.425 28.424 30.610 30.597 30.579
0.5 0.75 28.451 28.448 28.446 30.661 30.651 30.632
0.9 0.25 28.520 28.486 28.454 30.799 30.733 30.655
0.9 0.50 28.629 28.584 28.530 31.031 30.937 30.808
0.9 0.75 29.123 29.063 28.942 31.868 31.729 31.496
1.1 0.25 28.654 28.572 28.496 31.084 30.921 30.752
1.1 0.50 29.079 28.894 28.705 31.936 31.537 31.141
1.1 0.75 34.576 32.472 31.008 41.712 37.162 34.562
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Table 7: Variance of the exchange rate - 1
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 Optimal TR+q TR IFB+q IFB TRo TR+q R
0.25 0.25 0.5 44.263 46.725 45.423 44.597 56.045 43.301 46.255
0.25 0.5 0.5 44.143 46.657 45.31 44.421 55.79 43.156 46.172
0.25 0.75 0.5 43.983 46.565 45.163 44.182 55.446 42.964 46.047
0.5 0.25 0.5 44.522 46.924 45.652 44.92 56.547 43.6 46.465
0.5 0.5 0.5 44.374 46.815 45.506 44.712 56.239 43.418 46.344
0.5 0.75 0.5 44.152 46.663 45.295 44.393 55.774 43.148 46.17
0.75 0.25 0.5 45.058 47.287 46.129 45.547 57.529 44.212 46.895
0.75 0.5 0.5 44.895 47.178 45.957 45.324 57.2 44.003 46.752
0.75 0.75 0.5 44.594 46.936 45.649 44.911 56.594 43.627 46.481
0.25 0.25 0.9 45.23 47.623 46.431 45.99 58.254 44.652 47.263
0.25 0.5 0.9 44.866 47.298 45.986 45.399 57.351 44.088 46.864
0.25 0.75 0.9 44.404 46.874 45.49 44.7 56.285 43.444 46.398
0.5 0.25 0.9 47.182 49.355 48.319 48.264 61.863 47.023 49.066
0.5 0.5 0.9 46.503 48.512 47.359 47.14 60.157 45.869 48.171
0.5 0.75 0.9 45.513 47.507 46.227 45.734 58.003 44.467 47.086
0.75 0.25 0.9 56.875 57.495 57.402 58.652 76.441 57.776 57.587
0.75 0.5 0.9 55.237 54.9 54.356 55.389 72.107 54.417 54.67
0.75 0.75 0.9 52.23 50.999 50.341 50.873 65.956 49.79 50.693
0.25 0.25 1.1 46.12 49.013 47.834 47.745 61.068 46.474 48.744
0.25 0.5 1.1 45.532 48.056 46.754 46.417 59.018 45.131 47.691
0.25 0.75 1.1 44.791 47.196 45.789 45.143 57.031 43.884 46.735
0.5 0.25 1.1 52.247 56.288 55.391 56.39 74.257 55.592 55.981
0.5 0.5 1.1 50.603 52.048 51.07 51.619 67.225 50.584 51.811
0.5 0.75 1.1 48.166 48.768 47.689 47.606 61.13 46.413 48.436
0.75 0.25 1.1 207.04 210.14 211.03 226.71 277.5 225.5 209.36
0.75 0.5 1.1 188.17 115.68 116.73 126.74 159.42 125.11 115.34
0.75 0.75 1.1 151.52 70.244 71.464 77.02 99.965 75.595 70.084
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Table 8: Variance of the exchange rate - 2
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 TR R TR+q RI TR RI TR+q I TR I IFB+q I IFB I
0.25 0.25 0.5 45.081 46.252 45.081 46.659 45.404 44.597 56.045
0.25 0.5 0.5 44.967 46.165 44.964 46.607 45.295 44.421 55.79
0.25 0.75 0.5 44.825 46.045 44.812 46.564 45.157 44.181 55.446
0.5 0.25 0.5 45.324 46.466 45.321 46.853 45.635 44.919 56.547
0.5 0.5 0.5 45.172 46.349 45.171 46.81 45.494 44.711 56.239
0.5 0.75 0.5 44.96 46.165 44.952 46.64 45.289 44.393 55.774
0.75 0.25 0.5 45.822 46.894 45.821 47.252 46.108 45.547 57.529
0.75 0.5 0.5 45.644 46.753 45.643 47.179 45.943 45.323 57.2
0.75 0.75 0.5 45.328 46.482 45.326 46.901 45.648 44.91 56.593
0.25 0.25 0.9 46.154 47.256 46.151 47.579 46.413 45.994 58.257
0.25 0.5 0.9 45.687 46.864 45.685 47.239 45.978 45.401 57.353
0.25 0.75 0.9 45.172 46.404 45.165 46.874 45.49 44.7 56.286
0.5 0.25 0.9 48.124 49.052 48.115 49.347 48.307 48.267 61.867
0.5 0.5 0.9 47.126 48.171 47.121 48.534 47.362 47.139 60.159
0.5 0.75 0.9 45.947 47.093 45.947 47.52 46.225 45.733 58.004
0.75 0.25 0.9 57.418 57.501 57.37 57.663 57.281 58.642 76.44
0.75 0.5 0.9 54.353 54.64 54.34 54.868 54.335 55.369 72.106
0.75 0.75 0.9 50.222 50.726 50.239 50.993 50.359 50.849 65.955
0.25 0.25 1.1 47.644 48.744 47.636 49.012 47.827 47.761 61.081
0.25 0.5 1.1 46.511 47.703 46.506 48.09 46.762 46.425 59.026
0.25 0.75 1.1 45.49 46.745 45.489 47.182 45.805 45.145 57.035
0.5 0.25 1.1 55.403 55.957 55.361 56.029 55.262 56.396 74.278
0.5 0.5 1.1 51.004 51.815 50.992 52.01 51.047 51.617 67.235
0.5 0.75 1.1 47.44 48.45 47.446 48.785 47.647 47.602 61.135
0.75 0.25 1.1 212.44 204.28 210.55 204.46 208.83 227.02 278.16
0.75 0.5 1.1 117.68 113.75 117.45 113.85 116.8 126.91 159.74
0.75 0.75 1.1 71.928 69.819 72.216 69.97 72.023 77.009 100.12
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Table 9: Variance of pid - 1
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 Optimal TR+q TR IFB+q IFB TRo TR+q R
0.25 0.25 0.5 7.6157 8.6583 8.7011 10.763 11.407 10.25 8.7532
0.25 0.5 0.5 7.6154 8.6525 8.6972 10.77 11.411 10.25 8.7456
0.25 0.75 0.5 7.615 8.6438 8.6899 10.785 11.417 10.25 8.7348
0.5 0.25 0.5 7.6164 8.6738 8.7145 10.75 11.402 10.251 8.7678
0.5 0.5 0.5 7.616 8.6702 8.7104 10.758 11.406 10.251 8.7603
0.5 0.75 0.5 7.6154 8.6575 8.7026 10.775 11.413 10.25 8.7476
0.75 0.25 0.5 7.6177 8.7015 8.7385 10.734 11.395 10.252 8.7945
0.75 0.5 0.5 7.6172 8.6975 8.7358 10.741 11.398 10.252 8.7903
0.75 0.75 0.5 7.6165 8.6874 8.7288 10.758 11.406 10.251 8.7758
0.25 0.25 0.9 7.6181 8.7449 8.7762 10.751 11.439 10.253 8.8325
0.25 0.5 0.9 7.6172 8.7264 8.7663 10.753 11.432 10.252 8.8108
0.25 0.75 0.9 7.6161 8.6913 8.7375 10.769 11.428 10.251 8.7765
0.5 0.25 0.9 7.6227 8.8419 8.877 10.722 11.452 10.258 8.9201
0.5 0.5 0.9 7.6211 8.8171 8.8557 10.727 11.439 10.255 8.8945
0.5 0.75 0.9 7.6187 8.7699 8.8121 10.749 11.429 10.252 8.8463
0.75 0.25 0.9 7.6407 9.0913 9.0768 10.713 11.516 10.295 9.1639
0.75 0.5 0.9 7.6375 9.0695 9.0834 10.716 11.479 10.282 9.1588
0.75 0.75 0.9 7.6315 9.064 9.0896 10.733 11.438 10.267 9.1161
0.25 0.25 1.1 7.6203 8.8497 8.8714 10.757 11.505 10.256 8.9263
0.25 0.5 1.1 7.6189 8.7975 8.8446 10.75 11.47 10.253 8.876
0.25 0.75 1.1 7.617 8.7361 8.7822 10.762 11.444 10.251 8.8153
0.5 0.25 1.1 7.6337 9.0889 9.0964 10.715 11.616 10.28 9.184
0.5 0.5 1.1 7.6301 9.0483 9.0367 10.716 11.521 10.267 9.0979
0.5 0.75 1.1 7.6245 8.9199 8.9183 10.738 11.457 10.257 8.9787
0.75 0.25 1.1 7.8494 9.8478 9.8925 10.777 12.623 11.239 10.14
0.75 0.5 1.1 7.8223 10.159 10.464 10.771 11.806 10.649 10.268
0.75 0.75 1.1 7.7696 10.095 10.071 10.766 11.45 10.379 10.135
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Table 10: Variance of pid - 2
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 TR R TR+q RI TR RI TR+q I TR I IFB+q I IFB I
0.25 0.25 0.5 8.779 8.7541 8.7789 8.6565 8.7156 10.763 11.407
0.25 0.5 0.5 8.7702 8.7463 8.7722 8.6519 8.7082 10.77 11.411
0.25 0.75 0.5 8.753 8.7352 8.7618 8.6448 8.6941 10.785 11.417
0.5 0.25 0.5 8.7915 8.769 8.7931 8.6725 8.7278 10.75 11.402
0.5 0.5 0.5 8.7858 8.7613 8.7858 8.6701 8.7204 10.758 11.406
0.5 0.75 0.5 8.7688 8.748 8.774 8.6585 8.707 10.775 11.413
0.75 0.25 0.5 8.8172 8.798 8.8168 8.6998 8.7541 10.735 11.395
0.75 0.5 0.5 8.8118 8.7894 8.8124 8.6991 8.7467 10.741 11.398
0.75 0.75 0.5 8.8 8.7777 8.8015 8.6875 8.7324 10.758 11.406
0.25 0.25 0.9 8.8604 8.8373 8.8606 8.7496 8.7996 10.752 11.439
0.25 0.5 0.9 8.8368 8.8128 8.8373 8.7275 8.7718 10.753 11.432
0.25 0.75 0.9 8.7997 8.7791 8.8043 8.6974 8.736 10.768 11.428
0.5 0.25 0.9 8.9451 8.9319 8.9487 8.8597 8.8806 10.723 11.452
0.5 0.5 0.9 8.9189 8.9008 8.9218 8.8341 8.8495 10.727 11.439
0.5 0.75 0.9 8.8727 8.8502 8.8738 8.7749 8.8147 10.749 11.429
0.75 0.25 0.9 9.1745 9.2009 9.2023 9.1538 9.1644 10.713 11.516
0.75 0.5 0.9 9.1714 9.1796 9.1838 9.1297 9.151 10.717 11.479
0.75 0.75 0.9 9.1274 9.1204 9.1295 9.0767 9.0961 10.736 11.438
0.25 0.25 1.1 8.9526 8.9346 8.9563 8.8621 8.8904 10.759 11.506
0.25 0.5 1.1 8.9037 8.8813 8.9064 8.8169 8.8358 10.751 11.471
0.25 0.75 1.1 8.8436 8.8185 8.8445 8.7405 8.7705 10.762 11.444
0.5 0.25 1.1 9.2038 9.2284 9.2389 9.1938 9.2121 10.715 11.617
0.5 0.5 1.1 9.1206 9.1174 9.1337 9.0758 9.1037 10.716 11.522
0.5 0.75 1.1 9.0036 8.9864 9.007 8.9316 8.9661 10.738 11.457
0.75 0.25 1.1 10.059 11.516 11.462 11.593 11.628 10.777 12.597
0.75 0.5 1.1 10.21 10.755 10.651 10.792 10.761 10.785 11.79
0.75 0.75 1.1 10.08 10.209 10.149 10.24 10.182 10.793 11.44
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Table 11: Variance of y - 1
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 Optimal TR+q TR IFB+q IFB TRo TR+q R
0.25 0.25 0.5 7.3605 8.0302 8.0691 10.18 10.199 8.1065 8.0881
0.25 0.5 0.5 7.3589 8.0288 8.0677 10.177 10.192 8.1039 8.0897
0.25 0.75 0.5 7.3566 8.0281 8.0676 10.166 10.182 8.1002 8.0934
0.5 0.25 0.5 7.3636 8.0254 8.0651 10.188 10.212 8.1113 8.0828
0.5 0.5 0.5 7.3617 8.0216 8.0638 10.184 10.204 8.1086 8.0844
0.5 0.75 0.5 7.3587 8.0234 8.0625 10.173 10.19 8.1041 8.0876
0.75 0.25 0.5 7.3691 8.0212 8.0586 10.194 10.234 8.12 8.0745
0.75 0.5 0.5 7.3672 8.0174 8.0568 10.192 10.226 8.1178 8.0727
0.75 0.75 0.5 7.3636 8.0148 8.0547 10.183 10.21 8.1132 8.0771
0.25 0.25 0.9 7.3741 7.9906 8.0418 10.199 10.215 8.1297 8.0473
0.25 0.5 0.9 7.3696 7.988 8.0313 10.201 10.204 8.122 8.0529
0.25 0.75 0.9 7.3631 8.001 8.04 10.188 10.189 8.1115 8.0681
0.5 0.25 0.9 7.3936 7.9587 7.9913 10.213 10.27 8.1588 8.0173
0.5 0.5 0.9 7.3865 7.9583 7.9936 10.214 10.249 8.1487 8.0203
0.5 0.75 0.9 7.3751 7.9672 8.0058 10.201 10.218 8.1322 8.0363
0.75 0.25 0.9 7.4587 7.9656 7.9855 10.176 10.47 8.25 7.9895
0.75 0.5 0.9 7.4466 7.945 7.9688 10.194 10.419 8.24 7.9616
0.75 0.75 0.9 7.4229 7.8825 7.8969 10.212 10.34 8.2158 7.9542
0.25 0.25 1.1 7.3861 7.9315 7.9963 10.215 10.217 8.1556 7.9921
0.25 0.5 1.1 7.3791 7.9499 7.9847 10.217 10.206 8.1401 8.0144
0.25 0.75 1.1 7.369 7.9724 8.0135 10.201 10.191 8.1216 8.0432
0.5 0.25 1.1 7.4426 7.8971 7.9518 10.225 10.372 8.2477 7.9258
0.5 0.5 1.1 7.4271 7.8578 7.9537 10.232 10.314 8.2123 7.9338
0.5 0.75 1.1 7.402 7.9001 7.9751 10.221 10.252 8.1703 7.9744
0.75 0.25 1.1 8.1493 8.4969 8.3885 10.076 12.448 9.152 8.3701
0.75 0.5 1.1 8.0602 7.9925 7.5688 10.127 11.367 8.7933 7.9977
0.75 0.75 1.1 7.8829 7.8024 7.6659 10.237 10.753 8.5607 7.8268
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Table 12: Variance of y - 2
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 TR R TR+q RI TR RI TR+q I TR I IFB+q I IFB I
0.25 0.25 0.5 8.1404 8.0872 8.1406 8.0356 8.0534 10.18 10.199
0.25 0.5 0.5 8.1452 8.0892 8.1431 8.0318 8.056 10.177 10.192
0.25 0.75 0.5 8.1572 8.093 8.1477 8.0268 8.0631 10.166 10.182
0.5 0.25 0.5 8.1358 8.0814 8.134 8.0306 8.0506 10.188 10.212
0.5 0.5 0.5 8.1369 8.0827 8.1368 8.0218 8.0527 10.184 10.204
0.5 0.75 0.5 8.1471 8.087 8.1414 8.0223 8.0576 10.173 10.191
0.75 0.25 0.5 8.1242 8.0703 8.1246 8.0244 8.0418 10.194 10.234
0.75 0.5 0.5 8.1258 8.0733 8.1251 8.0148 8.0447 10.192 10.226
0.75 0.75 0.5 8.1299 8.0744 8.1282 8.0156 8.0497 10.183 10.21
0.25 0.25 0.9 8.0933 8.0429 8.0935 7.988 8.012 10.199 10.215
0.25 0.5 0.9 8.1049 8.0505 8.1045 7.9899 8.0251 10.201 10.204
0.25 0.75 0.9 8.1264 8.0644 8.1212 7.9926 8.0414 10.188 10.189
0.5 0.25 0.9 8.0557 8.006 8.0525 7.9392 7.9884 10.213 10.27
0.5 0.5 0.9 8.0658 8.0126 8.0623 7.9358 7.9995 10.214 10.249
0.5 0.75 0.9 8.0855 8.0299 8.0837 7.9581 8.0019 10.201 10.218
0.75 0.25 0.9 7.9925 7.9484 7.9559 7.8726 7.8883 10.176 10.47
0.75 0.5 0.9 7.9709 7.9391 7.9562 7.8651 7.8811 10.192 10.419
0.75 0.75 0.9 7.9723 7.9407 7.968 7.8589 7.8864 10.207 10.34
0.25 0.25 1.1 8.0391 7.9851 8.0362 7.9198 7.9684 10.213 10.217
0.25 0.5 1.1 8.0645 8.0081 8.0617 7.9258 7.994 10.216 10.207
0.25 0.75 1.1 8.0965 8.0385 8.0953 7.967 8.0248 10.202 10.191
0.5 0.25 1.1 7.948 7.8765 7.9039 7.7906 7.824 10.225 10.373
0.5 0.5 1.1 7.9658 7.9124 7.9513 7.8274 7.8642 10.232 10.315
0.5 0.75 1.1 8.0155 7.9609 8.0099 7.879 7.9213 10.22 10.252
0.75 0.25 1.1 8.283 7.4809 7.2296 7.3573 7.0552 10.08 12.524
0.75 0.5 1.1 7.8862 7.6211 7.4576 7.5363 7.3295 10.121 11.406
0.75 0.75 1.1 7.6775 7.7331 7.5636 7.6381 7.4911 10.215 10.771
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Table 13: Variance of pi - 1
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 Optimal TR+q TR IFB+q IFB TRo TR+q R
0.25 0.25 0.5 6.7138 7.9531 7.94 11.577 12.904 9.6091 8.0766
0.25 0.5 0.5 6.7052 7.9432 7.9303 11.572 12.886 9.601 8.0636
0.25 0.75 0.5 6.6921 7.9282 7.9144 11.571 12.863 9.5898 8.0441
0.5 0.25 0.5 6.7317 7.9796 7.9654 11.585 12.935 9.624 8.1029
0.5 0.5 0.5 6.7215 7.9719 7.9552 11.58 12.917 9.6155 8.0894
0.5 0.75 0.5 6.7045 7.9506 7.9371 11.578 12.889 9.6017 8.0667
0.75 0.25 0.5 6.7623 8.0246 8.0112 11.608 12.994 9.6518 8.1499
0.75 0.5 0.5 6.7522 8.0185 8.0036 11.605 12.98 9.6446 8.1418
0.75 0.75 0.5 6.7318 8.0004 7.9864 11.601 12.953 9.6301 8.1168
0.25 0.25 0.9 6.7926 8.0969 8.0776 11.668 13.118 9.6792 8.2174
0.25 0.5 0.9 6.7683 8.0655 8.0475 11.635 13.048 9.6551 8.178
0.25 0.75 0.9 6.7317 8.006 7.9926 11.605 12.962 9.6232 8.1173
0.5 0.25 0.9 6.9021 8.2656 8.2539 11.772 13.349 9.7727 8.3781
0.5 0.5 0.9 6.8642 8.2207 8.2082 11.731 13.257 9.7396 8.3297
0.5 0.75 0.9 6.8 8.1364 8.1229 11.678 13.124 9.6878 8.2404
0.75 0.25 0.9 7.2299 8.7392 8.7099 12.248 14.058 10.096 8.8486
0.75 0.5 0.9 7.1693 8.7032 8.691 12.185 13.957 10.055 8.821
0.75 0.75 0.9 7.0457 8.6336 8.632 12.061 13.764 9.9698 8.7169
0.25 0.25 1.1 6.8629 8.2727 8.2454 11.787 13.381 9.7568 8.3838
0.25 0.5 1.1 6.8248 8.1852 8.176 11.712 13.225 9.709 8.2941
0.25 0.75 1.1 6.7672 8.0801 8.0654 11.643 13.056 9.6529 8.185
0.5 0.25 1.1 7.1737 8.7678 8.7268 12.192 14.167 10.058 8.8813
0.5 0.5 1.1 7.0915 8.6236 8.5709 12.018 13.817 9.9421 8.7036
0.5 0.75 1.1 6.9523 8.3859 8.3272 11.839 13.447 9.8083 8.4739
0.75 0.25 1.1 10.5 12.63 12.724 17.522 21.363 13.901 12.947
0.75 0.5 1.1 10.081 11.563 11.995 15.444 18.184 12.246 11.688
0.75 0.75 1.1 9.2335 10.628 10.701 13.98 16.307 11.264 10.682
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Table 14: Variance of pi - 2
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 TR R TR+q RI TR RI TR+q I TR I IFB+q I IFB I
0.25 0.25 0.5 8.0492 8.0772 8.0489 7.9471 7.957 11.577 12.904
0.25 0.5 0.5 8.0332 8.0639 8.0354 7.9395 7.9432 11.573 12.886
0.25 0.75 0.5 8.0054 8.0443 8.0154 7.9292 7.9194 11.571 12.863
0.5 0.25 0.5 8.0742 8.1039 8.076 7.974 7.9809 11.585 12.935
0.5 0.5 0.5 8.0616 8.0906 8.0615 7.9713 7.9668 11.58 12.917
0.5 0.75 0.5 8.0322 8.067 8.0381 7.9502 7.9423 11.578 12.889
0.75 0.25 0.5 8.1234 8.1537 8.1228 8.02 8.0295 11.608 12.994
0.75 0.5 0.5 8.1123 8.1405 8.1128 8.0202 8.0162 11.605 12.98
0.75 0.75 0.5 8.0884 8.1192 8.0901 7.9985 7.9901 11.601 12.953
0.25 0.25 0.9 8.1943 8.221 8.1938 8.0983 8.1014 11.669 13.118
0.25 0.5 0.9 8.1499 8.1795 8.1499 8.0627 8.0533 11.635 13.048
0.25 0.75 0.9 8.0838 8.1204 8.089 8.0127 7.9905 11.604 12.962
0.5 0.25 0.9 8.3587 8.3874 8.3609 8.2822 8.2555 11.772 13.349
0.5 0.5 0.9 8.3055 8.3351 8.3075 8.2396 8.1986 11.731 13.257
0.5 0.75 0.9 8.2147 8.2453 8.2155 8.1426 8.1253 11.678 13.124
0.75 0.25 0.9 8.8484 8.8715 8.8669 8.791 8.7856 12.25 14.058
0.75 0.5 0.9 8.8188 8.8351 8.825 8.7516 8.7512 12.187 13.957
0.75 0.75 0.9 8.7078 8.7239 8.7086 8.6478 8.6374 12.062 13.764
0.25 0.25 1.1 8.3581 8.3897 8.3606 8.2839 8.259 11.79 13.383
0.25 0.5 1.1 8.2671 8.2989 8.2692 8.2082 8.164 11.713 13.226
0.25 0.75 1.1 8.1565 8.1889 8.1572 8.0842 8.0506 11.643 13.056
0.5 0.25 1.1 8.8706 8.9129 8.8972 8.846 8.8329 12.192 14.169
0.5 0.5 1.1 8.6879 8.719 8.6972 8.6459 8.6314 12.018 13.817
0.5 0.75 1.1 8.4534 8.4839 8.4563 8.4 8.3828 11.839 13.448
0.75 0.25 1.1 12.988 13.813 13.97 13.924 14.141 17.577 21.394
0.75 0.5 1.1 11.749 11.969 12.024 12.012 12.12 15.488 18.195
0.75 0.75 1.1 10.768 10.735 10.819 10.758 10.818 14 16.311
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Table 15: Variance of i - 1
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 Optimal TR+q TR IFB+q IFB TRo TR+q R
0.25 0.25 0.5 2.0443 11.144 11.115 21.285 22.959 12.154 11.374
0.25 0.5 0.5 2.0437 11.126 11.096 21.287 22.96 12.142 11.357
0.25 0.75 0.5 2.0429 11.101 11.068 21.296 22.963 12.125 11.331
0.5 0.25 0.5 2.0458 11.183 11.154 21.273 22.942 12.177 11.409
0.5 0.5 0.5 2.045 11.165 11.134 21.276 22.946 12.164 11.39
0.5 0.75 0.5 2.0438 11.132 11.1 21.287 22.953 12.143 11.359
0.75 0.25 0.5 2.0489 11.252 11.224 21.264 22.911 12.221 11.472
0.75 0.5 0.5 2.048 11.237 11.207 21.266 22.917 12.21 11.458
0.75 0.75 0.5 2.0464 11.204 11.174 21.275 22.93 12.187 11.424
0.25 0.25 0.9 2.0493 11.336 11.322 21.283 23.014 12.262 11.544
0.25 0.5 0.9 2.0475 11.281 11.255 21.273 22.995 12.224 11.491
0.25 0.75 0.9 2.0451 11.198 11.168 21.278 22.977 12.175 11.416
0.5 0.25 0.9 2.0609 11.566 11.55 21.265 22.929 12.411 11.75
0.5 0.5 0.9 2.0571 11.49 11.469 21.255 22.927 12.357 11.68
0.5 0.75 0.9 2.0516 11.364 11.338 21.261 22.934 12.275 11.564
0.75 0.25 0.9 2.1208 12.199 12.201 21.356 22.76 12.962 12.355
0.75 0.5 0.9 2.1109 12.144 12.135 21.323 22.776 12.881 12.297
0.75 0.75 0.9 2.0928 11.989 11.983 21.288 22.819 12.728 12.139
0.25 0.25 1.1 2.054 11.565 11.558 21.296 23.126 12.382 11.74
0.25 0.5 1.1 2.051 11.436 11.418 21.27 23.049 12.306 11.627
0.25 0.75 1.1 2.0472 11.286 11.26 21.268 22.995 12.22 11.492
0.5 0.25 1.1 2.0908 12.233 12.218 21.311 22.933 12.874 12.357
0.5 0.5 1.1 2.0813 11.98 11.963 21.268 22.901 12.679 12.121
0.5 0.75 1.1 2.0673 11.662 11.631 21.254 22.904 12.462 11.834
0.75 0.25 1.1 3.002 15.414 15.492 21.699 24.751 20.001 15.52
0.75 0.5 1.1 2.8913 14.716 14.923 21.585 23.597 16.741 14.822
0.75 0.75 1.1 2.6759 14.029 14.151 21.431 23.062 14.888 14.107
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Table 16: Variance of i - 2
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 TR R TR+q RI TR RI TR+q I TR I IFB+q I IFB I
0.25 0.25 0.5 11.329 11.376 11.33 11.142 11.121 21.285 22.959
0.25 0.5 0.5 11.309 11.357 11.31 11.125 11.101 21.287 22.96
0.25 0.75 0.5 11.28 11.332 11.283 11.102 11.07 21.296 22.963
0.5 0.25 0.5 11.365 11.411 11.366 11.182 11.159 21.273 22.942
0.5 0.5 0.5 11.345 11.392 11.346 11.167 11.139 21.276 22.946
0.5 0.75 0.5 11.31 11.36 11.312 11.131 11.103 21.287 22.953
0.75 0.25 0.5 11.432 11.475 11.432 11.252 11.231 21.264 22.911
0.75 0.5 0.5 11.415 11.459 11.416 11.241 11.213 21.266 22.917
0.75 0.75 0.5 11.38 11.426 11.381 11.204 11.174 21.276 22.93
0.25 0.25 0.9 11.51 11.551 11.512 11.343 11.324 21.284 23.014
0.25 0.5 0.9 11.451 11.495 11.452 11.285 11.258 21.273 22.995
0.25 0.75 0.9 11.369 11.418 11.371 11.201 11.169 21.278 22.977
0.5 0.25 0.9 11.726 11.768 11.734 11.59 11.561 21.265 22.929
0.5 0.5 0.9 11.648 11.692 11.655 11.511 11.475 21.255 22.926
0.5 0.75 0.9 11.525 11.57 11.527 11.374 11.344 21.261 22.934
0.75 0.25 0.9 12.366 12.428 12.422 12.308 12.293 21.358 22.76
0.75 0.5 0.9 12.295 12.345 12.332 12.22 12.203 21.329 22.776
0.75 0.75 0.9 12.129 12.159 12.138 12.021 12 21.297 22.819
0.25 0.25 1.1 11.713 11.753 11.72 11.583 11.558 21.3 23.127
0.25 0.5 1.1 11.591 11.635 11.596 11.454 11.419 21.27 23.049
0.25 0.75 1.1 11.449 11.496 11.451 11.292 11.256 21.268 22.995
0.5 0.25 1.1 12.353 12.431 12.413 12.333 12.317 21.311 22.931
0.5 0.5 1.1 12.103 12.161 12.133 12.035 12.012 21.269 22.901
0.5 0.75 1.1 11.803 11.848 11.811 11.687 11.66 21.255 22.904
0.75 0.25 1.1 15.702 17.739 18.327 17.767 18.176 21.717 24.716
0.75 0.5 1.1 14.988 15.723 16.032 15.744 15.994 21.637 23.589
0.75 0.75 1.1 14.278 14.294 14.473 14.296 14.441 21.508 23.061
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Table 17: Variance of i− i−1 - 1
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 Optimal TR+q TR IFB+q IFB TRo TR+q R
0.25 0.25 0.5 0.66116 6.5116 6.5014 13.329 14.965 6.2309 6.3843
0.25 0.5 0.5 0.66062 6.4842 6.4768 13.338 14.99 6.2053 6.3552
0.25 0.75 0.5 0.65984 6.4461 6.4417 13.362 15.027 6.1713 6.3154
0.5 0.25 0.5 0.66241 6.5629 6.5513 13.31 14.927 6.2747 6.4355
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.66174 6.5356 6.5261 13.32 14.954 6.2489 6.4068
0.5 0.75 0.5 0.66067 6.4917 6.4856 13.346 14.999 6.2089 6.3611
0.75 0.25 0.5 0.66475 6.6541 6.6396 13.296 14.867 6.3558 6.5284
0.75 0.5 0.5 0.66404 6.6356 6.6222 13.303 14.891 6.3362 6.508
0.75 0.75 0.5 0.66265 6.5971 6.5854 13.324 14.939 6.2979 6.4668
0.25 0.25 0.9 0.66578 6.7864 6.7626 13.303 14.931 6.4592 6.6537
0.25 0.5 0.9 0.66424 6.703 6.6984 13.3 14.961 6.3812 6.5682
0.25 0.75 0.9 0.66205 6.5907 6.5879 13.324 15.008 6.2823 6.4549
0.5 0.25 0.9 0.67411 7.0906 7.0903 13.286 14.824 6.7385 6.9536
0.5 0.5 0.9 0.67134 6.9961 6.9919 13.279 14.862 6.6411 6.858
0.5 0.75 0.9 0.66697 6.8424 6.8364 13.301 14.931 6.4947 6.7027
0.75 0.25 0.9 0.70407 7.8317 7.8726 13.393 14.68 7.6457 7.7743
0.75 0.5 0.9 0.69879 7.8258 7.829 13.361 14.705 7.5694 7.7607
0.75 0.75 0.9 0.68857 7.7792 7.7822 13.334 14.783 7.3999 7.6341
0.25 0.25 1.1 0.66998 7.0974 7.0593 13.3 14.97 6.7079 6.949
0.25 0.5 1.1 0.66752 6.927 6.925 13.285 14.978 6.5562 6.7809
0.25 0.75 1.1 0.66405 6.7232 6.7204 13.305 15.009 6.3827 6.5808
0.5 0.25 1.1 0.69417 7.8791 7.9015 13.323 14.79 7.5961 7.8019
0.5 0.5 1.1 0.68788 7.6781 7.6002 13.287 14.812 7.2723 7.5267
0.5 0.75 1.1 0.67787 7.3008 7.3107 13.288 14.883 6.8979 7.1527
0.75 0.25 1.1 1.011 12.354 12.393 13.86 15.657 16.975 12.219
0.75 0.5 1.1 0.97144 11.457 11.499 13.699 15.147 13.601 11.403
0.75 0.75 1.1 0.89295 10.794 10.993 13.509 14.966 11.511 10.765
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Table 18: Variance of i− i−1 - 2
p11 p22 ρ
q
1 TR R TR+q RI TR RI TR+q I TR I IFB+q I IFB I
0.25 0.25 0.5 6.3708 6.3882 6.3715 6.5166 6.4999 13.329 14.965
0.25 0.5 0.5 6.3423 6.3583 6.3428 6.4889 6.4752 13.338 14.99
0.25 0.75 0.5 6.3039 6.3173 6.3033 6.4488 6.4415 13.362 15.027
0.5 0.25 0.5 6.4214 6.4404 6.4224 6.5691 6.5511 13.31 14.927
0.5 0.5 0.5 6.3929 6.411 6.3943 6.5409 6.5268 13.32 14.954
0.5 0.75 0.5 6.3484 6.3635 6.3485 6.4969 6.486 13.346 14.999
0.75 0.25 0.5 6.5117 6.5333 6.5136 6.662 6.6392 13.296 14.867
0.75 0.5 0.5 6.4917 6.5128 6.4935 6.6425 6.6236 13.303 14.891
0.75 0.75 0.5 6.4513 6.4695 6.4519 6.6026 6.5885 13.324 14.94
0.25 0.25 0.9 6.6485 6.6724 6.6534 6.8069 6.7836 13.305 14.931
0.25 0.5 0.9 6.5606 6.5817 6.5651 6.7191 6.7041 13.3 14.961
0.25 0.75 0.9 6.4455 6.4613 6.4473 6.6011 6.5921 13.324 15.007
0.5 0.25 0.9 6.9548 6.9917 6.9701 7.1331 7.1097 13.286 14.823
0.5 0.5 0.9 6.8525 6.8864 6.8659 7.0318 7.0144 13.279 14.861
0.5 0.75 0.9 6.6927 6.7166 6.6988 6.8635 6.8465 13.301 14.931
0.75 0.25 0.9 7.8031 7.9095 7.904 8.0589 8.0406 13.394 14.68
0.75 0.5 0.9 7.7723 7.8481 7.8358 8.0056 7.9791 13.367 14.705
0.75 0.75 0.9 7.6437 7.6831 7.6639 7.8396 7.8135 13.346 14.784
0.25 0.25 1.1 6.9529 6.9835 6.9653 7.1324 7.1137 13.305 14.968
0.25 0.5 1.1 6.7782 6.8042 6.7879 6.9536 6.9415 13.285 14.977
0.25 0.75 1.1 6.5728 6.5911 6.5775 6.738 6.7327 13.304 15.009
0.5 0.25 1.1 7.8279 7.9565 7.9388 8.1237 8.0924 13.323 14.787
0.5 0.5 1.1 7.5342 7.6103 7.5886 7.7771 7.7492 13.288 14.81
0.5 0.75 1.1 7.149 7.1889 7.1676 7.3515 7.3277 13.29 14.882
0.75 0.25 1.1 12.378 15.046 15.521 15.052 15.379 13.836 15.588
0.75 0.5 1.1 11.581 12.717 13.086 12.774 13.072 13.727 15.12
0.75 0.75 1.1 11.026 11.121 11.382 11.21 11.45 13.586 14.961
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